The two-dimensional argument against materialism and its semantic premise

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Karol Polcyn

Abstract

David Chalmers argues that zombies are possible because they are ideally conceivable and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on the physical. In this paper I discuss the most influential criticism of the conceivability-possibility principle in the current literature. According to that criticism, the conceivability-possibility principle is unjustified because it depends on a certain unjustified assumption concerning the semantic conditions under which necessary statements can be true a posteriori, namely that a posteriority is due to contingency at the reference-fixing level, so that a necessary statement can be true a posteriori only if at least one of the concepts flanking the identity sign refers contingently.

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How to Cite
Polcyn, Karol. 2011. “The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism and Its Semantic Premise”. Diametros, no. 29 (September):80-92. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.29.2011.447.
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Author Biography

Karol Polcyn, University of Szczecin

Karol Polcyn, PhD Department of Philosophy University of Szczecin ul. Krakowska 61/ 69 71-017 Szczecin Poland karol_polcyn@gmail.com
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