Physicalism and the Explanatory Gap

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Published: Nov 25, 2013
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.6.2005.164

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Karol Polcyn

Abstract

The source of the intuition of the explanatory gap has never been well understood. It has not been clear why there should be some troublesome explanatory gap given that we have all the empirical evidence for the truth of psychophysical identity. I argue that there is a very natural intuition which explains why the explanatory gap is real and I defend my account against physicalists who deny that the explanatory gap has any significance. On my account, our inability to explain consciousness in physical terms shows that psychophysical identity, even if justified, is not fully intelligible.

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How to Cite
“Physicalism and the Explanatory Gap”. 2013. Diametros, no. 6 (November): 49-69. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.6.2005.164.
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No. 6 (2005)
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Author Biography

Karol Polcyn

Karol Polcyn -  absolwent filozofii na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim, uzyskał doktorat z filozofii na Uniwersytecie Temple w Filadelfii w 2003 r., obecnie adiunkt w Instytucie Filozofii Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, publikował w „Filozofii Nauki”, „Kwartalniku Filozoficznym” i „Principiach”.

How to Cite

“Physicalism and the Explanatory Gap”. 2013. Diametros, no. 6 (November): 49-69. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.6.2005.164.
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