The conceivability argument and the intuition of dualism

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Karol Polcyn

Abstract

Kripke’s antimaterialist argument, under David Papineau’s new interpretation, is not based on assuming that the conceivability of zombies entails possibility and does not lead to the conclusion that materialism is false but rather to the conclusion that we are all in the grip of the intuitive feeling that materialism is false. Leaving it open whether or not Papineau’s interpretation of Kripke’s argument is correct, I argue here that by appealing to the intuition of dualism we can see that the conceivability of zombies is not a reliable guide to possibility.

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How to Cite
Polcyn, Karol. 2010. “The Conceivability Argument and the Intuition of Dualism”. Diametros, no. 24 (June):90-106. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.24.2010.396.
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Karol Polcyn

Karol Polcyn - dr, Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Szczeciński
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