The so-called problem of simple minds (in Polish)

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Adriana Schetz

Abstract

This article is concerned with what is known as "the problem of simple minds", considered by four participants in the debate on the possibility of attributing the mental life to animals without assigning them the ability to use language: Donald Davidson, John McDowell, Peter Carruthers, and Jose L. Bermudez. The first two defend the belief-desire model of thinking in which the ability to use language plays a decisive role. The other two combine the belief-desire model with an argument against the connection of thought with language. After analyzing in detail the arguments of both positions I favor the solution proposed by Carruthers and Bermudez.

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How to Cite
Schetz, Adriana. 2011. “The so-Called Problem of Simple Minds (in Polish)”. Diametros, no. 30 (December):41-60. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.30.2011.455.
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Author Biography

Adriana Schetz, Szczecin University

Adriana Schetz, PhD Szczecin University Institute of Philosophy ul. Krakowska 71-79 Pl-71-017 Szczecin e-mail: aschetz@univ.szczecin.pl
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