Disjunctivism in perception

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Adriana Schetz

Abstract

I claim in the paper that there is an important difference between episodes of veridical perceptual experiences and illusions or hallucinations. In the case of the latter, our experience displays no phenomenal difference from a situation in which we enjoy proper or veridical perception. According to M. G. F. Martin and his disjunctivist position, in the case of illusions and hallucinations one has no reflective knowledge that one is deceived by mistaken perception. However, there are features of the phenomena in question which entail the difference in principle. My conclusion is similar to Martin’s, but I propose to supplement his position with the additional idea that only representational contents enable us to explain the difference between veridical and non-veridical perception.

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How to Cite
Schetz, Adriana. 2007. “Disjunctivism in Perception”. Diametros, no. 14 (December):85-104. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.14.2007.290.
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Author Biography

Adriana Schetz

Adriana Schetz, dr, adiunkt w zakładzie Ontologii i Filozofii Analitycznej w Instytucie Filozofii Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, absolwentka Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego oraz Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, przebywała na stypendiach w Uniwersytecie Środkowoeuropejskim w Budapeszcie (2002) oraz w Uniwersytecie Stanu Ohio, USA (w ramach programu Fulbright, 2006). Interesuje się filozofią analityczną, epistemologią oraz naukami kognitywnymi. Jest autorką publikacji w Filozofii Nauki, Kwartalniku Filozoficznym, Przeglądzie Filozoficznym oraz Ruchu Filozoficznym.
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