A thought experiment against the determinism of the will (in Polish)

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Published: Mar 1, 2013
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.35.2013.510
Keywords:
philosophy of mind, determinism, free will, causal theory of mind, causal closure of the physical world, third-person view, predictability of human actions

Main Article Content

Ryszard Philipp
University School of Physical Education in Cracow

Abstract

The article presents a thought experiment against the deterministic theory of consciousness (i.e. free will), which is a consequence of a naturalistic (materialist) and physicalist approach to the problem of consciousness, prevailing in contemporary philosophy of mind. The physicalist approach presupposes the possibility of third-person descriptions of human actions in physical terms, and a fortiori the predictability, in principle, of human behaviour. The experiment emphasizes some consequences of this approach, especially some logical problems to which it gives rise.

Article Details

How to Cite
“A Thought Experiment Against the Determinism of the Will (in Polish)”. 2013. Diametros, no. 35 (March): 84-92. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.35.2013.510.
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No. 35 (2013)
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Articles

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Author Biography

Ryszard Philipp, University School of Physical Education in Cracow

Ryszard Philipp, PhD
University School of Physical Education in Cracow
Department of Humanities
ul. Jana Pawła II 78
Pl- 31-571 Kraków
e-mail: msg@philippozofia.pl

How to Cite

“A Thought Experiment Against the Determinism of the Will (in Polish)”. 2013. Diametros, no. 35 (March): 84-92. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.35.2013.510.
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