Must Right-Libertarians Embrace Easements by Necessity?

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Łukasz Dominiak
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6192-8468

Abstract

The present paper investigates the question of whether right-libertarians must accept easements by necessity. Since easements by necessity limit the property rights of the owner of the servient tenement, they apparently conflict with the libertarian homestead principle, according to which the person who first mixes his labor with the unowned land acquires absolute ownership thereof. As we demonstrate in the paper, however, the homestead principle understood in such an absolutist way generates contradictions within the set of rights distributed on its basis. In order to avoid such contradictions, easements by necessity must be incorporated into the libertarian theory of property rights and the homestead principle must be truncated accordingly.

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How to Cite
Dominiak, Łukasz. 2019. “Must Right-Libertarians Embrace Easements by Necessity?”. Diametros 16 (60), 34-51. https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1241.
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Articles
Author Biography

Łukasz Dominiak, Wydział Politologii i Studiów Międzynarodowych Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu; Faculty of Political Science and International Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun

Łukasz Dominiak, dr

Wydział Politologii i Studiów Międzynarodowych

Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu

ul. Batorego 39L, 87-100 Toruń, Polska

e-mail: lukasdominiak80@gmail.com

 

Łukasz Dominiak, PhD

Faculty of Political Science and International Studies

Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun

Batorego 39L Street, 87-100 Torun, Poland

e-mail: lukasdominiak80@gmail.com

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