The Controversy Over the Application of Parsimony Principle in Medical Diagnosis
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The principle of parsimony in relation to medical diagnosis states that a physician should always choose simpler diagnostic hypotheses. This principle is the subject of analysis not only by philosophers of science but also by clinicians. The article will demonstrate that the significance of this principle is not based on its a priori justification (the perspective of philosophers) but on the fact that it can serve as a starting point for a better understanding of the process of generating new hypotheses in medical diagnosis. It will be shown that in this process, the diagnostician is guided by three main rules of data management: the principle of errors avoidance (PEA), the principle of epistemic benefits increase (EBI) and the disease prevalence condition (DPC). These rules have different roles in diagnostic decisions in various epistemic contexts.
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