In Defence of Type-A Materialism

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Published: Sep 19, 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.49.2016.921
Keywords:
Phenomenal Concepts Type-A materialism Type-B materialism Knowledge Argument Non-conceptual content

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Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira
Federal University in Rio de Janeiro

Abstract

In this paper, I argue against the phenomenal concept strategy (henceforth PCS) and in favor of what Chalmers has called type-A materialism (2006; 2010: 111). On her release, Mary makes no cognitive discovery at all; not even a thin non-possibility-eliminating discovery, as Tye has recently claimed (2012). When she is imprisoned, Mary already knows everything that is to be known about the phenomenal character of her experiences. What Mary acquires is a new non-cognitive and nonconceptual representation.

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How to Cite
Pereira, Roberto Horácio Sá. 2016. “In Defence of Type-A Materialism”. Diametros, no. 49 (September):68-83. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.49.2016.921.
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No. 49 (2016)
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Author Biography

Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira, Federal University in Rio de Janeiro

Roberto Horácio Sá PereiraAssociate ProfessorFederal University in Rio de JaneiroRua Engenheiro Alvaro Niemeyer, casa 113São Conrado, Rio de Janeiro/ RJ BrazilE-mail: robertohsp@gmail.com

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