How To Get Rid of Closure

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Mariusz Grygianiec

Abstract

Sophie Gibb has recently invented a very interesting strategy against Kim’s causal exclusion argument. This strategy adopts the powers theory of causation and an interpretation of mental causation in terms of double prevention. Gibb’s strategy results both in invalidating the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain in most of its formulations and in disarming the argument in question. In my paper, I present a general procedure for the opponents of reductive physicalism which enables them to grapple successfully with the mentioned principle. I also argue that although it could be possible to adopt Gibb’s strategy as a part of this procedure, there is a simpler one to obtain a similar outcome. This strategy is mainly based on Uwe Meixner’s causal argument against physicalism and it leads to the conclusion that if one accepts the principle of sufficient cause (i.e. the principle of sufficient reason in its causal variant), then one should reject the principle of causal closure in the light of some empirical data. This alternative proposal is more attractive than Gibb’s solution, since it is independent of any conception of causation, does not make any distinction between causal relevance and causal efficacy, and does not refer to the notion of double prevention.

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Grygianiec, Mariusz. 2016. “How To Get Rid of Closure”. Diametros, no. 48 (June):1-17. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.48.2016.888.
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Author Biography

Mariusz Grygianiec, Institut für Philosophie, Universität Augsburg

Mariusz Grygianiec, PhD (dr hab.)Institut für Philosophie, Universität AugsburgUniversitätsstraße 1086135 AugsburgGermanyE-mail: mgrygian@uw.edu.pl
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