Searle and Putnam on the Nature of Mental States (in Polish)

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Published: Dec 20, 2015
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.46.2015.837
Keywords:
Searle, Putnam, mental states, internalism, externalism, Cartesian Theater, perception, intentionality

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Przemysław Paleczny
University of Opole

Abstract

The paper deals with the controversy between internalism and externalism on the nature of mental states, and its relevance to the philosophy of perception. In particular, the controversy between Hilary Putnam's natural realism and John Searle's direct realism is discussed. It is argued that Searle's defense of internalism fails to meet Putnam’s objections. Putnam’s case is even strengthened and the very source of the internalism vs. externalism controversy is identified in their shared assumptions. The rejection of these assumptions, together with the underlying myth of Cartesian Theater, makes the controversy meaningless. Finally, the relations of Searle’s and Putnam’s views to the Cartesian framework in the philosophy of perception are discussed.

Article Details

How to Cite
“Searle and Putnam on the Nature of Mental States (in Polish)”. 2015. Diametros, no. 46 (December): 74-91. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.46.2015.837.
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No. 46 (2015)
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Author Biography

Przemysław Paleczny, University of Opole

Przemysław Paleczny
University of Opole
Department of Philosophy
ul. Katowicka 89
45-061 Opole
E-mail: przemek.nysa@interia.pl

How to Cite

“Searle and Putnam on the Nature of Mental States (in Polish)”. 2015. Diametros, no. 46 (December): 74-91. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.46.2015.837.
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References

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Putnam [1999a] – Hilary Putnam, Pragmatyzm. Pytania otwarte, przeł. Bohdan Chwedeńczuk, Aletheia, Warszawa 1999.

Putnam [1999b] – Hilary Putnam, The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World, Columbia University Press, New York 1999.

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Searle [2010] – John Searle, Umysł. Krótkie wprowadzenie, przeł. J. Karłowski, Rebis, Poznań 2010.