Freedom without alternatives. In search for a basis for moral responsibility (in Polish)

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Maja Kittel
Leopold Hess

Abstract

The problem of free will and the related problem of attributing moral responsibility are among the most discussed issues in contemporary philosophy. In the present paper we argue against the standard approach to this issue in terms of (in)compatibilism and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Invoking the arguments of Leibniz and some twentieth-century authors, we show that philosophers should focus on the issue of the conscious sense of agency that accompanies our voluntary actions. In the final part of the paper we point out some promising lines of research on the empirical grounds of the sense of agency conducted by neurobiologists, cognitive scientists, and advocates of the embodied cognition paradigm.

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How to Cite
Kittel, Maja, and Leopold Hess. 2012. “Freedom Without Alternatives. In Search for a Basis for Moral Responsibility (in Polish)”. Diametros, no. 34 (December):51-78. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.34.2012.498.
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Author Biographies

Maja Kittel, Jagiellonian University

Maja Kittel, MA, MSc Jagiellonian University Department of Philosophy ul. Grodzka 52 Pl-31-044 Kraków e-mail: sherlock.kittel@gmail.com

Leopold Hess, Jagiellonian University

Leopold Hess, MA Jagiellonian University Department of Philosophy ul. Grodzka 52 Pl-31-044 Kraków e-mail: leopoldhess@gmail.com
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