Responsibility for the Morally Vulnerable
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Abstract
In this article, I analyze a conflict between two general moral intuitions. The first, formulated by Max Scheler as the principle of solidarity, states that we are all responsible for the moral worth of every other person. According to the second, the moral condition of an agent can only be taken care of by himself. I present an attempt to reconcile the above two principles using the category of moral vulnerability. In the first part, I present the main conflict points between the principle of solidarity and the principle of individual self-responsibility. In the second - I identify the concepts of moral vulnerability present in the ethical literature and analyze the corresponding modifications of the principle of solidarity. In the third, I offer a definition of moral vulnerability as a relational phenomenon in which one agent, through their actions or omissions, can influence whether another will find themselves in or be able to recover from a situation of moral conflict. I argue that this understanding of moral vulnerability allows for the formulation of a convincing version of the principle of solidarity consistent with the principle of individual self-responsibility.
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