Truth, conceptual schemes, and the world

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Published: Sep 1, 2005
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.5.2005.131

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Bartosz Orlewski

Abstract

In the article I criticize the conception according to which the conceptual character of human cognition falsifies the theory of truth understood as a kind of correspondence between the truth-bearer and the truth-maker. Arguing against the conceptions of Josef Mitterer, Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty and Andrzej Szahaj, I defend the claim that the conceptual character of human cognition is irrelevant to the critique of correspondence theories of truth. I justify this claim by using the example of Nicolas Rescher’s conception of conceptual idealism, which is similar to Hilary Putnam's internal realism but does not rule out truth as a kind of correspondence.

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How to Cite
“Truth, Conceptual Schemes, and the World”. 2005. Diametros, no. 5 (September): 51-82. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.5.2005.131.
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No. 5 (2005)
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Articles

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How to Cite

“Truth, Conceptual Schemes, and the World”. 2005. Diametros, no. 5 (September): 51-82. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.5.2005.131.
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