Putnam and ontology, or what is conceptual relativity

Abstract

The paper tries to clarify, as far as possible, Hilary Putnam's attitude toward ontology by means of a careful interpretation of his doctrine of conceptual relativity. I think there is a great deal of confusion about the real meaning of this doctrine. It is true that the idea of conceptual relativity has been modified a few times by Putnam himself. However, in his most recent work he gives an accurate and succinct presentation of it. He puts strong emphasis on showing how much his philosophical position differs from that of Quine and Davidson. He accuses both of them of neglecting human subjectivity and reducing the colorful world of human experience and language. At the same time he insists that one should accept the pluralism of our world and avoid all forms of monism. Since ontology leads often to monism, Putnam rejects ontology. But it seems to me that one can develop an ontology that is free of monistic tendencies and does full justice to the plurality of our world.