Is it possible to be indifferent to one's own moral convictions?

Article Sidebar

PDF (Polish)
Published: Jun 1, 2009
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.20.2009.348

Main Article Content

Tomasz Żuradzki

Abstract

The article contains a discussion and critique of the theory of the motivational internalism of convictions, which maintains that moral convictions of necessity motivate action. A distinction is made between this thesis and other metaethical positions, sometimes simply called "internalism". The author also shows the connection between the above thesis and important metaethical disputes. The main part of the article is devoted to presenting arguments that refer to cases of moral indifferentism and are directed against this sort of internalist thesis.

Article Details

How to Cite
“Is It Possible to Be Indifferent to one’s Own Moral Convictions?”. 2009. Diametros, no. 20 (June): 132-48. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.20.2009.348.
Issue
No. 20 (2009)
Section
Articles

By submitting his/her work to the Editorial Board, the author accepts, upon having his/her text recommended for publication, that Diametros applies the Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license to the works we publish. Under this license, authors agree to make articles legally available for reuse, without permission or fees. Anyone may read, download, copy, print, distribute or reuse these articles without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author, as long as the author and original source are properly cited. The author holds the copyright without any other restrictions. Full information about CC-BY: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.

Author Biography

Tomasz Żuradzki

Tomasz Żuradzki - absolwent Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego i London School of Economics, przygotowuje rozprawę doktorską z filozofii.

How to Cite

“Is It Possible to Be Indifferent to one’s Own Moral Convictions?”. 2009. Diametros, no. 20 (June): 132-48. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.20.2009.348.
Share |
Crossref
Scopus
Google Scholar
Europe PMC

References

Brink [1989] – D.O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989.

Brink [1997] – D.O. Brink, Moral Motivation, „Ethics” (108) 1997, s. 4-32.

Damasio [2002] – A.R. Damasio, Błąd Kartezjusza. Emocje, rozum i ludzki mózg, przeł. M. Karpiński, Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, Poznań 2002.

Darwall [1983] – S. Darwall, Impartial Reason, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY) 1983.

Falk [1947] – W.D. Falk, ’Ought’ and Motivation, „Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society” (48) 1947-48, s. 111-138.

Frankena [1958] – W.K. Frankena, Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy [w:] Essays in Moral Philosophy, red. A.I. Melden, University of Washinghton Press, Seattle 1958, s. 40-81.

Foot [1972] – Ph. Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, „The Philosophical Review” (81) 1972, s. 305-316.

Garrard, McNaughton [1998] – E. Garrard, D. McNaughton, Mapping Moral Motivation, „Ethical Theory and Moral Practice” (1) 1998, s. 45-59.

Hare [2001] – R.M. Hare, Myślenie moralne, przeł. J. Margański, Fundacja Aletheia, Warszawa 2001.

Hare [1998] – R.M. Hare, Uniwersalny preskryptywizm, przeł. A. Jedynak [w:] Przewodnik po etyce, red. P. Singer, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1998, s. 499-511.

Lockie [1998] – R. Lockie, What’s Wrong with Moral Internalism, „Ratio” (11) 1998, s. 14-36.

Łuków [2004] – P. Łuków, Kanta odkrycie normatywności, „Diametros” (1) 2004, s. 1-31.

Mackie [1977] – J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Pelican Books, London 1977.

McDowell [1978] – J. McDowell, Are Moral Reasons Hypothetical Imperatives?, “Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society” (Supplementary Volume 52) 1978, s. 13-29.

Mele [1996] – A.R. Mele, Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness, „Ethics” (106) 1996, s. 727-753.

Milo [1984] – R.D. Milo, Immorality, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984.

Nagel [1970] – T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1970.

Nichols [2002] – S. Nichols, How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism: Is it Irrational to Be Amoral?, „The Monist” (85) 2002, s. 285-303.

Parfit [1997] – D. Parfit, Reasons and Motivation, „Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society” (Supplementary Volume 71) 1997, s. 99-130.

Radcliffe [2006] – E.S. Radcliffe, Moral internalism and moral cognitivism in Hume’s metaethics, „Synthese” (152) 2006, s. 353-370.

Railton [1986] – P. Railton, Moral Realism, “The Philosophical Review” (95) 1986, s. 163-207.

Roskies [2003] – A. Roskies, Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from “acquired sociopathy”, „Philosophical Psychology” (16) 2003, s. 51-66.

Shafer-Landau [1998] – R. Shafer-Landau, Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation, „Philosophical Quarterly” (48) 1998, s. 353-358.

Shafer-Landau [2003] – R. Shaffer-Landau, Moral Realism. A Defence, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003.

Smith [1995] – M. Smith, The Moral Problem, Blackwell, Oxford 1995.

Stevenson [1937] – C.L. Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, „Mind” (46) 1937, s. 14-31.

Stocker [1979] – M. Stocker, Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology, „The Journal of Philosophy” (76) 1979, s. 738-753.

Svavarsdóttir [1999] – S. Svavardóttir, Moral Cognitivism and Motivation, „The Philosophical Review” (108) 1999, s. 161-219.

Williams [1981] – B. Williams, Internal and External Reasons [w:] B. Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981, s. 101-113.

Zangwill [2003] – N. Zangwill, Externalist Moral Motivation, „American Philosophical Quarterly” (40) 2003, s. 143-154.