Is it possible to be indifferent to one's own moral convictions?

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Published: Jun 1, 2009
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.20.2009.348

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Tomasz Żuradzki

Abstract

The article contains a discussion and critique of the theory of the motivational internalism of convictions, which maintains that moral convictions of necessity motivate action. A distinction is made between this thesis and other metaethical positions, sometimes simply called "internalism". The author also shows the connection between the above thesis and important metaethical disputes. The main part of the article is devoted to presenting arguments that refer to cases of moral indifferentism and are directed against this sort of internalist thesis.

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How to Cite
Żuradzki, Tomasz. 2009. “Is It Possible to Be Indifferent to one’s Own Moral Convictions?”. Diametros, no. 20 (June):132-48. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.20.2009.348.
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No. 20 (2009)
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Articles

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Author Biography

Tomasz Żuradzki

Tomasz Żuradzki - absolwent Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego i London School of Economics, przygotowuje rozprawę doktorską z filozofii.
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