Special issue: The Normative Significance of Empirical Moral Psychology

Many psychologists have tried to reveal the formation of moral judgments by using a variety of empirical methods: behavioral data, tests of statistical significance, and brain imaging. Meanwhile, some scholars maintain that the new empirical findings of the ways we make moral judgments question the trustworthiness and authority of many intuitive ethical responses. The aim of this issue is to encourage scholars to rethink how, if at all, it is possible to draw any normative conclusions by discovering the psychological processes underlying moral judgments. Editor: Tomasz Żuradzki.

Published: 2020-06-30

Editorial

The Normative Significance of Empirical Moral Psychology

Tomasz Żuradzki

1-5

PDF
DOI: https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1626

Articles

Misunderstanding Metaethics: Difficulties Measuring Folk Objectivism and Relativism

Lance S. Bush, David Moss

6-21

PDF
DOI: https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1495

Ultrasound Viewers’ Attribution of Moral Status to Fetal Humans: A Case for Presumptive Rationality

Heidi M. Giebel

22-35

PDF
DOI: https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1472

Charting Moral Psychology’s Significance for Bioethics: Routes to Bioethical Progress, its Limits, and Lessons from Moral Philosophy

Michael Klenk

36-55

PDF
DOI: https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1520

Some Challenges for Research on Emotion and Moral Judgment: The Moral Foreign-Language Effect as a Case Study

Steven McFarlane, Heather Cipolletti Perez

56-71

PDF
DOI: https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1476

X-Phi and Impartiality Thought Experiments: Investigating the Veil of Ignorance

Norbert Paulo, Thomas Pölzler

72-89

PDF
DOI: https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1499

Discussions

Morality, Normativity, and the Good System 2 Fallacy

Wim De Neys

90-95

PDF
DOI: https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1447