Morality, Normativity, and the Good System 2 Fallacy

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Published: Feb 12, 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1447
Keywords:
reasoning decision making dual process theory moral reasoning normative fallacy

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Wim De Neys
Paris Descartes University
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0917-8852

Abstract

In this commentary, I warn against a possible dual process misconception that might lead people to conclude that utilitarian judgments are normatively correct. I clarify how the misconception builds on (1) the association between System 2 and normativity in the dual process literature on logical/probabilistic reasoning, and (2) the classification of utilitarian judgments as resulting from System 2 processing in the dual process model of moral reasoning. I present theoretical and empirical evidence against both premises.
 

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How to Cite
De Neys, Wim. 2020. “Morality, Normativity, and the Good System 2 Fallacy”. Diametros 17 (64):90-95. https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1447.
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Vol. 17 No. 64 (2020)
Section
Discussions

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