Substantive logics of fiction. Part II: T. Parsons’ theory of nonexistent objects (in Polish)

Main Article Content

Jacek Gurczyński

Abstract

This paper presents T. Parsons’ system of Meinongian logic, designed for the analysis of fictional objects. It was the first formal Meinongian system, and it directs formal inquiries concerning the problematic of fiction. The argument points out the main philosophical assumptions of Meinongian logics, including Brentano’s thesis of intentionality, Meinong’s Annahmen Thesis and Leibniz-Meinong’s law of identity. Subsequently, the syntax and semantics of Parsons’ system are presented. What follows is a critical analysis of the system, highlighting its most controversial point, the division of properties into nuclear and extranuclear. Status of fictional objects is also discussed. The conclusion is that the main advantage of Parsons’ system is its innovativeness.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Article Details

How to Cite
Gurczyński, Jacek. 2012. “Substantive Logics of Fiction. Part II: T. Parsons’ Theory of Nonexistent Objects (in Polish)”. Diametros, no. 34 (December):22-33. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.34.2012.496.
Section
Articles
Author Biography

Jacek Gurczyński, Maria Curie-Sklodowska University

Jacek Gurczyński, PhD Maria Curie-Sklodowska University Department of Philosophy Plac Marii Curie Skłodowskiej 4 Pl-20-031 Lublin e-mail: jgurczyn@gmail.com
Share |

References

Crittenden [1991] – C. Crittenden, Unreality. The Metaphysics of fictional Objects, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1991.
View in Google Scholar

Fine [1984] – K. Fine, Critical Review of Parsons Non-Existent Objects, „Philosophical Studies” (45) 1984, s. 95–142.
View in Google Scholar

Grygianiec [2005] – M. Grygianiec, Teoria obiektów abstrakcyjnych Edwarda N. Zalty. Analiza i krytyka, „Filozofia Nauki” (49) 2005, s. 25–40.
View in Google Scholar

Gurczyński [2004] – J. Gurczyński, Alexius Meinong i Roman Ingarden o intencjonalności i przedmiotach fikcyjnych, [w:] Intencjonalność jako kategoria filozofii umysłu i filozofii języka, red. Z. Muszyński, J. Paśniczek, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2004, s. 67–84.
View in Google Scholar

Gurczyński [2011] – J. Gurczyński, Deflacyjne [redukcyjne] koncepcje przedmiotów fikcyjnych. Przegląd i analiza, „Filozofia Nauki” (73) 2011, s. 134–152.
View in Google Scholar

Howell [1983] – R. Howell, Non-Existent Objects. Terence Parsons, „Journal of Philosophy” (80) 1983, s. 163–173.
View in Google Scholar

Parsons [1975] – T. Parsons, A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects, „Grazer Philosophische Studien” (1) 1975, s. 73–86 (przekład polski: Meinongowska analiza przedmiotów fikcyjnych (brak nazwiska tłum.), [w:] Ontologia fikcji, red. J. Paśniczek, Warszawa, 1991, s. 137–152).
View in Google Scholar

Parsons [1979] – T. Parsons, Referring to Nonexistent Objects, „Theory and Decision” (11) 1979, s. 95–110.
View in Google Scholar

Parsons [1980] – T. Parsons, Nonexistent Objects, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1980.
View in Google Scholar

Paśniczek [1984a] – J. Paśniczek, O przedmiotach nieistniejących, „Studia Filozoficzne” (4) 1984, s. 207–211.
View in Google Scholar

Paśniczek [1984b] – Struktura ontologiczna przedmiotów nieistniejących: Meinong a Ingarden, „Studia Filozoficzne” (4) 1984, s. 27–41.
View in Google Scholar

Paśniczek [1992] – J. Paśniczek, The Meinongian Logic vs. The Classical Logic, [w:] Theories of Objects: Meinong and Twardowski, red. J. Paśniczek, Wydawnictwo UMCS Lublin, Lublin 1992, s. 105–112.
View in Google Scholar

Paśniczek [1999] – J. Paśniczek, The Logic of Intentional Objects. A Meinongian Version of Classical Logic, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1999.
View in Google Scholar

Rapaport [1985] – W. J. Rapaport, To Be and Not To Be, „Nous” (19) 1985, s. 255–271. Review of Amie Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics (bez autora), dostępne na: http://www.mit.edu/~yablo/fmrev.html (22.11.2010).
View in Google Scholar

Thomasson [1999] – A.L. Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999.
View in Google Scholar