Wittgenstein 1929-1930 – the Color Exclusion Problem (in Polish)

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Szymon Nowak


Wittgenstein introduced his claim about colour incompatibility originally in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, where he stated that there could be only one colour in one place and time. It is commonly believed that Wittgenstein abandoned his conception of logical atomism when he realized the consequences of this claim. The aim of this article is to provide an interpretation of the colour incompatibility claim in terms of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology. I will focus on two works of great significance for the claim: Some Remarks on Logical Form and Philosophical Remarks. These two works were written between 1929 and 1930, which is the beginning of the “middle period” in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I will focus not only on Wittgenstein’s formulation of the colour incompatibility claim, but also on how this claim was justified. The explanation of Wittgenstein’s justification of this claim will help to understand his phenomenology and theory of philosophical grammar.


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Nowak, Szymon. 2015. “Wittgenstein 1929-1930 – the Color Exclusion Problem (in Polish)”. Diametros, no. 43 (March):118-36. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.43.2015.720.
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Szymon Nowak, Jagiellonian University

Szymon Nowak, MAJagiellonian UniversityDepartment of Philosophyul. Grodzka 52Pl-31-044 KrakówE-mail: ssnowak@gmail.com
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