William Ramsey on folk psychology, rationality and the concept of representation in cognitive science (in Polish)

Article Sidebar

PDF (Język Polski) PDF (In Polish) Full text (Język Polski)
Published: Mar 1, 2012
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.31.2012.462
Keywords:
eliminativism personal/subpersonal folk psychology rationality mental representation William Ramsey

Main Article Content

Paweł Gładziejewski
Nicolaus Copernicus University

Abstract

In his book Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey argues against the view that the concept of mental representation employed by cognitive scientists should be based on the folk-psychological concept of mental representation as propositional attitudes. The author of the present article will attempt to show that, contrary to what Ramsey himself claims, the fact that the folk concept of mental representation will most likely not be a part of the conceptual repository of cognitive science does not imply that beliefs, desires or the rationality of human cognition should be eliminated from the naturalistic outlook on the nature of mind (construed as a cognitive system) and cognitive processes. The key to see that this is the case lies in understanding cognitive systems as multi-level, hierarchically organized mechanisms.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Article Details

How to Cite
Gładziejewski, Paweł. 2012. “William Ramsey on Folk Psychology, Rationality and the Concept of Representation in Cognitive Science (in Polish)”. Diametros, no. 31 (March):33-55. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.31.2012.462.
Issue
No. 31 (2012)
Section
Articles

By submitting his/her work to the Editorial Board, the author accepts, upon having his/her text recommended for publication, that Diametros applies the Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license to the works we publish. Under this license, authors agree to make articles legally available for reuse, without permission or fees. Anyone may read, download, copy, print, distribute or reuse these articles without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author, as long as the author and original source are properly cited. The author holds the copyright without any other restrictions. Full information about CC-BY: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.

Author Biography

Paweł Gładziejewski, Nicolaus Copernicus University

Paweł Gładziejewski, MA Nicolaus Copernicus University Institute of Philosophy ul. Fosa Staromiejska 1A Pl-87-100 Toruń e-mail: pawel_gla@o2.pl
Share |
Crossref
Scopus
Google Scholar
Europe PMC

References

Bechtel [1994] – W. Bechtel, Levels of description and explanation in cognitive science, „Minds and Machines” (4) 1994, s. 1-25.
View in Google Scholar

Bechtel [1998] – W. Bechtel, Representations and cognitive explanations: assessing the dynamicist's challenge in cognitive science, „Cognitive Science” (22) 1998, s. 1-25.
View in Google Scholar

Bechtel [2005] – W. Bechtel, The challenge of characterizing operations in the mechanisms underlying behavior, „Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior” (84) 2005, s. 313-325.
View in Google Scholar

Bermudez [2000] – J.L. Bermudez, Personal and sub-personal: a difference without a distinction, „Philosophical Explorations” (3) 2000, s. 63-82.
View in Google Scholar

Chemero [2009] – A. Chemero, Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2009.
View in Google Scholar

Cummins [2000] – R. Cummins, ‘How does it work?’ versus ‘What are the laws?’: Two conceptions of psychological explanation, [w:] Explanation and Cognition, red. F. Keil, R.A. Wilson, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2000.
View in Google Scholar

Davies [1998] – M. Davies, Language, thought and the language of thought, [w:] Language and Thought, red. P. Carruthers, J. Boucher, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998.
View in Google Scholar

Davies [2000] – M. Davies, Persons and their underpinnings, „Philosophical Explorations” (3) 2000, s. 43-62.
View in Google Scholar

Dennett [1995] – D. Dennett, Osobowy i subosobowy poziom wyjaśniania: ból, tłum. P. Dziliński, [w:] Filozofia umysłu, red. B. Chwedeńczuk, Aletheia, Warszawa 1995.
View in Google Scholar

Dennett [2003] – D. Dennett, Naprawdę przekonani: strategia intencjonalna i dlaczego ona działa, „Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki” (4) 2003, s. 87-109.
View in Google Scholar

Dennett [2008] – D. Dennett, Rzeczywiste wzorce, (w:) Analityczna metafizyka umysłu. Najnowsze kontrowersje, red. M. Miłkowski, R. Poczobut, IFiS PAN, Warszawa 2008.
View in Google Scholar

Fodor [1975] – J. Fodor, The Language of Thought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1987.
View in Google Scholar

van Gelder [1995] – T. van Gelder, What might cognition be if not computation?, „The Journal of Philosophy” (92) 1995, s. 345-381.
View in Google Scholar

Goldman [2006] – A. Goldman, Simulating Minds. Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006.
View in Google Scholar

Grush [2003] – In defense of some ‘Cartesian’ assumptions concerning the brain and its operation, „Biology and Philosophy” (18) 2003, s. 53-93.
View in Google Scholar

Grush [2006] – R. Grush, How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness, „Synthese” (153) 2006, s. 417-450.
View in Google Scholar

Heal [1996] – J. Heal, Simulation, theory and content, [w:], Theories of Theories of Mind, red. P. Carruthers, P. Smith, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996.
View in Google Scholar

Henderson, Horgan [2004] – D. Henderson, T. Horgan, What does it take to be a true believer? Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism, (w:) Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture, red. Ch.E. Erneling, D.M. Johnson, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004.
View in Google Scholar

Hershbach [2008] – M. Hershbach, Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social perception, „Philosophical Explorations” (11) 2008, s. 223-235.
View in Google Scholar

Hornsby [2000] – J. Hornsby, Personal and sub-personal: A defence of Dennett’s early distinction, „Philosophical Explorations” (3) 2000, s. 6-24.
View in Google Scholar

Hurley [2008] – S. Hurley, The shared circuits model. How control, mirroring, and simulation can enable deliberation, imitation and mindreading, „Behavioral and Brain Sciences” (31) 2008, s. 1-22.
View in Google Scholar

Lycan [2004] – W. Lycan, A particularly compelling refutation of eliminative materialism, [w:] Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture, red. Ch.E. Erneling, D.M. Johnson, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004.
View in Google Scholar

McDowell [1994] – J. McDowell, The content of perceptual experience, „Philosophical Quarterly” (44) 1994, s. 190-205.
View in Google Scholar

Nichols [2002] – S. Nichols, Folk psychology, [w:] Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group, London 2002.
View in Google Scholar

Peacocke [1983] – Ch. Peacocke, Sense and Content, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1983.
View in Google Scholar

Pylyshyn [1984] – Z. Pylyshyn, Computation and Cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 1984.
View in Google Scholar

Ramsey [2007] – W. Ramsey, Representation Reconsidered, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007.
View in Google Scholar

Ramsey, Stich, Garon [1990] – W. Ramsey, S. Stich, J. Garon, Connectionism, eliminativism and the future of folk psychology, „Philosophical Perspctives” (4) 1990, s. 499-533.
View in Google Scholar

Stich [1985] – S. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, MIT Press Cambridge (MA) 1985.
View in Google Scholar

Thagard [1996] – P. Thagard, Cognitive Science, [w:] E.N. Zalta, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, dostępne na: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cognitive-science/ [10.02.2011].
View in Google Scholar