Intentional Reference and its Object in the Perspective of Husserl's Transcendental Idealism (in Polish)
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Abstract
The following issues are considered in the paper:
- The proper understanding of the ‘attempt to doubt’ recommended by Husserl in Ideas, Book I, as a point of departure on a way to the transcendental reduction.
- How intentional reference of an act of consciousness is possible and what it consists in, according to Husserl.
- A logical dependence between the characteristics of intentional reference and the standpoint of transcendental idealism in Husserl’s Ideas, Book I.
- How to understand Husserl’s claim that the intentional object (noema) is equivalent to sense.
I arrive at the conclusion that a fully consistent interpretation of Husserl’s declarations regarding the aforementioned issues does not seem to be possible; for one needs to modify Husserl’s standpoint in certain respects.
These considerations will be carried on in an article titled ‘The Noema as Sense. The Problem of the Object of Consciousness in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism’, forthcoming in Diametros.
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References
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