Remedy vs. Diagnosis. How Political Liberalism Accounts for Political Disagreement (in Polish)

Main Article Content

Wojciech Ciszewski
Adam Dyrda

Abstract

The problem of political disagreement is one of the most important problems, which provides the starting point for the construction of any contemporary political theory. Moreover, each and every theory can be evaluated by taking into account the efficacy of coping with different types of political disagreements. This paper discusses four different types of political disagreement (the error theory, value pluralism, the essential contestability of concepts, Lakoff’s metaphor theory) and aims at answering the question whether the theory of political liberalism (founded by J. Rawls) is a good (i.e. efficacious) remedy for political disagreement. The result is moderately positive, as far as it reveals the weak points of this theory.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Article Details

How to Cite
Ciszewski, Wojciech, and Adam Dyrda. 2013. “Remedy Vs. Diagnosis. How Political Liberalism Accounts for Political Disagreement (in Polish)”. Diametros, no. 37 (September):13-33. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.37.2013.526.
Section
Articles
Author Biographies

Wojciech Ciszewski, Jagiellonian University

Wojciech Ciszewski, MA Chair of Legal Theory, Department of Law and Administration, Jagiellonian University ul. Bracka 12 Pl-31-005 Kraków e-mail: ciszewski.wojciech@gmail.com

Adam Dyrda, Jagiellonian University

Adam Dyrda, PhD Chair of Legal Theory, Department of Law and Administration, Jagiellonian University ul. Bracka 12 Pl-31-005 Kraków e-mail: dyrdaadam@gmail.com
Share |

References

Ciszewski, Dyrda [2012] – W. Ciszewski, A. Dyrda, In Search for the Rational Response: Asessing the Rawlsian Foreground for Resolving Political and Legal Disagreements, [w:] Argumentation 2012, red. J. Savelka, et al., Brno 2012, s. 47-62.
View in Google Scholar

Collier [2006] – D. Collier, F.D. Hidalgo, A.O. Maciuceanu, Essentially contested concepts: Debates and applications, „Journal of Political Ideologies” (11) 2006, s. 211–246; dostępne: http://polisci.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/CollierD/Collier%20Gallie.pdf.
View in Google Scholar

Gallie [1956a] – W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, „Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society” (56) 1956, s. 167-198; dostępne: http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp- content/uploads/2011/05/Gallie-Essentially-Contested-Concepts.pdf.
View in Google Scholar

Gallie [1956b] – W.B. Gallie, Art as an Essentially Contested Concept, „The Philosophical Quaterly” (6) 1956, s. 97-114.
View in Google Scholar

Gallie [1971] – W.B. Gallie, Philosophy and Historical Understanding, 2nd edition, New York 1971, roz. 1.
View in Google Scholar

Gray [2001] – J. Gray, Dwie twarze liberalizmu, tłum. P. Rymarczyk, Wydawnictwo Fundacja Aletheia, Warszawa 2001.
View in Google Scholar

Lakoff [2002] – G. Lakoff, Moral Politics. How Liberals and Conservatives Think, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2002.
View in Google Scholar

Lakoff, Johnson [2010] – G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, Metafory w naszym życiu, przeł. T.P. Krzeszowski, Wydawnictwo Aletheia, Warszawa 2010.
View in Google Scholar

Larmore [1987] – Ch. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge University Press, 1987.
View in Google Scholar

MacIntyre [2007] – A. MacIntyre, Czyja sprawiedliwość? Jaka racjonalność?, tłum. zbiorowe, red. A. Chmielewski, Wydawnictwo Profesjonalne i Akademickie, Warszawa 2007.
View in Google Scholar

Mason [1993] – A. Mason, Explaining Political Disagreement, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993.
View in Google Scholar

McMahon [2009] – Ch. McMahon, Reasonable Disagreement. A Theory of Political Morality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009.
View in Google Scholar

Nagel [1987] – T. Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, „Philosophy & Public Affairs” (16) 1987, s. 215-240.
View in Google Scholar

Pogge [2007] – T. Pogge, John Rawls. His Life and Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, New York 2007.
View in Google Scholar

Polanowska-Sygulska [2008] – B. Polanowska-Sygulska, Pluralizm wartości i jego implikacje w filozofii prawa, Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, Kraków 2008.
View in Google Scholar

Quong [2007] – J. Quong, Political Liberalism without Scepticism, Ratio (20) 2007, s. 320-340.
View in Google Scholar

Quong [2011] – J. Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York 2011.
View in Google Scholar

Rawls [ 1999a] – J. Rawls, The Idea of Overlapping Consensus, [w:] Collected Papers, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1999.
View in Google Scholar

Rawls [1998] – J. Rawls, Liberalizm polityczny, tłum. A. Romaniuk, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1998.
View in Google Scholar

Rawls [1999b] – J. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, [w:] Collected Papers, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1999.
View in Google Scholar

Rawls [2001] – J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., London 2001.
View in Google Scholar

Raz [1990] – J. Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, „Philosophy & Public Affairs” (19) 1990, s. 3-46.
View in Google Scholar

Sandel [2009] – M. J. Sandel, Liberalizm a granice sprawiedliwości, tłum. A. Grobler, Wydawnictwo Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2009.
View in Google Scholar

Stout [2004] – J. Stout, Democracy and Tradition, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2004.
View in Google Scholar

Sunstein [2000] – C.S. Sunstein, Practical Reason and Incompletely Theorized Agreements, [w:] Reasoning Practically, red. E. Ullmann-Margalit, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, s. 98-122.
View in Google Scholar

Talisse [2009] – R. Talisse, Democracy and Moral Conflict, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009.
View in Google Scholar

Vallier [2011] – K. Vallier, Against Public Reason: Liberalism Accessibility Requirement, „Journal of Moral Philosophy” (8) 2011, s. 366–389.
View in Google Scholar

Waldron [1999] – J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford University Press, New York 1999.
View in Google Scholar

Waldron [2002] – J. Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentianally Contested Concept (in Florida)?, „Law and Philosophy” (21) 2002, s. 137-164; dostępne: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lawf0068/ROL_ECC.LP.perps.pdf.
View in Google Scholar

Williams [2000] – B. Williams, Moralność. Wprowadzenie do etyki, tłum. H. Miko, Wydawnictwo Aletheia, Warszawa 2000.
View in Google Scholar