Guises, identity and nonexistent objects (in Polish)

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Published: Mar 1, 2012
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.31.2012.463
Keywords:
Guise Theory, nonexistent objects, identity, quasi-Meinongianism, Hector-Neri Castañeda, Alexius Meinong, Ernst Mally

Main Article Content

Maciej Sendłak
University of Szczecin

Abstract

The article outlines the main motivations for the Guise Theory and its intriguing theses concerning identity, predication, existence, and fiction. The second part of the article is devoted to an assessment of Castañeda’s theory. It discusses the most influential critiques of the Guise Theory, as well as Russell’s objection (important from a historical point of view) to theories of nonexistent objects. The last section of the article contains a comparison of the Guise Theory with the Meinong’s Theory of Objects, and points out that despite various similarities, we should draw a distinction between original and moderate versions of Meinong’s theory. The main motivation for this distinction are differences between accounts of predications, which allow us to call the Guise Theory “quasi-Meinongian” rather than just “Meinongian”. This is because one of its main claims is taken from the work of Meinong’s pupil Ernst Mally, and not from Meinong himself.

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How to Cite
“Guises, Identity and Nonexistent Objects (in Polish)”. 2012. Diametros, no. 31 (March): 56-87. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.31.2012.463.
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No. 31 (2012)
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Author Biography

Maciej Sendłak, University of Szczecin

Maciej Sendłak, MA
Department of Philosophy
University of Szczecin
ul. Krakowska 71/ 79
71-004 Szczecin
Poland
maciej.sendlak@gmail.com

How to Cite

“Guises, Identity and Nonexistent Objects (in Polish)”. 2012. Diametros, no. 31 (March): 56-87. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.31.2012.463.
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