Hilary Putnam's two functionalisms. A piece of history with a moral (in Polish)

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Published: Sep 1, 2011
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.29.2011.444

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Witold Hensel
Centre for Philosophical Research

Abstract

The paper reconstructs the evolution of Hilary Putnam’s early, i.e. functionalist, views in the philosophy of mind. It distinguishes between the following two alternatives: weak functionalism, which asserts that traditional ontological questions about the mind are, in fact, pseudo-problems; and strong functionalism, the claim that the nature of mind can be discovered empirically if one acknowledges that mental states are defined relationally, without direct recourse to the properties of the brain. By analyzing Putnam’s reasons for rejecting weak functionalism and type physicalism the author arrives at the conclusion that Putnam was wrong on both counts: (1) weak functionalism was not an unstable position, and (2) if one is willing to make some reasonable assumptions, strong functionalism is reducible to type physicalism. Finally, an attempt is made to isolate the causes of the premature success of strong functionalism.

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How to Cite
Hensel, Witold. 2011. “Hilary Putnam’s Two Functionalisms. A Piece of History With a Moral (in Polish)”. Diametros, no. 29 (September):31-49. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.29.2011.444.
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No. 29 (2011)
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Articles

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Author Biography

Witold Hensel, Centre for Philosophical Research

Witold Hensel, PhD Centre for Philosophical Research ul. Stawki 3/20, 00-193 Warszawa Poland whensel@poczta.onet.pl
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