The Myth of the Given and the Grip of the Given

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Published: Mar 1, 2011
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.27.2011.426

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Robert Hanna
University of Colorado at Boulder, USA

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the Sellarsian Myth of the Given does not apply to all forms of Non-Conceptualism; that Kant is in fact a non-conceptualist of the right-thinking kind and not a Conceptualist, as most Kant-interpreters think; and that an intelligible and defensible Kantian Non-Conceptualism can be developed which supports the thesis that true perceptual beliefs are non-inferentially justified and also normatively funded by direct, embodied, intentional interactions with the manifest world (a.k.a. the Grip of the Given).

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How to Cite
“The Myth of the Given and the Grip of the Given”. 2011. Diametros, no. 27 (March): 25-46. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.27.2011.426.
Issue
No. 27 (2011)
Section
Special topic – Perspectives on Experience – Kant and Contemporary Analytic Philosophy

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Author Biography

Robert Hanna, University of Colorado at Boulder, USA

Robert Hanna
Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Colorado at Boulder, USA

How to Cite

“The Myth of the Given and the Grip of the Given”. 2011. Diametros, no. 27 (March): 25-46. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.27.2011.426.
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