Signs and intentionality. Laird Addis's arguments for the existence of properties of mental acts

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Published: Sep 1, 2009
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.21.2009.351

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Andrzej Dąbrowski

Abstract

In this article we present a clarification of the problem of intentionality that combines the psychologistic and phenomenological-logical traditions, but at the same time is naturalistic. Laird Addis's theory of intentionality, which we try to reconstruct here, falls into this category. He explains intentionality by using Ockham's concept of a natural sign. Such a sign is a property of a mental act. According to Addis, there are important arguments for the existence of such signs: (1) scientific (behavior varies according to what a person thinks - this implies the existence of properties of mental states), (2) phenomenological (through natural signs we find a justification for our certainty regarding the characteristics of our states of consciousness), and (3) dialectic (referring to the common sense fact that there is an unconventional, natural, and stable representation).

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How to Cite
Dąbrowski, Andrzej. 2009. “Signs and Intentionality. Laird Addis’s Arguments for the Existence of Properties of Mental Acts”. Diametros, no. 21 (September):1-13. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.21.2009.351.
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No. 21 (2009)
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Articles

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References

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