The Overcoming of Cartesian Dualism In The Light Of The Wittgenstein's "Other Minds" Problem

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Published: Jun 1, 2006
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.8.2006.223

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Iwona Gładysiewicz

Abstract

In this article I am showing how Wittgenstein in his second philosophy overcomes Cartesian dualism in the light of the other minds problem. My standpoint is presented in a wider perspective, which takes into consideration other conception and theories a.o. Strawson ‘s double aspect theory and behaviorism. Mainly I am concentrating on following issues: the use of mental expressions from the first and third person perspective, the concept of criterion ,- which is crucial for my argumentation -how do we learn the mental expressions , the mutual connection between first and third person mental expressions.

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How to Cite
Gładysiewicz, Iwona. 2006. “The Overcoming of Cartesian Dualism In The Light Of The Wittgenstein’s ‘Other Minds’ Problem”. Diametros, no. 8 (June):13-55. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.8.2006.223.
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No. 8 (2006)
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Author Biography

Iwona Gładysiewicz

Iwona Gładysiewicz, mgr
Od 2002 doktorantka Filozofii oraz Europeistyki Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego . Tytuł pracy doktorskiej z zakresu filozofii: Konsekwencje pragmatyzmu w świetle współczesnych sporów o filozofię języka. Stypendystka Programu Socrates/Erasmus oraz SYLFF. Studia doktoranckie prowadziła również na Tilburg University (Holandia) oraz Harvard University (USA).
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