Handling Disagreement in Vaccine Research: From Trustworthy Experts to Trustworthy Institutions
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Abstract
Recent philosophical investigations on the topic of vaccination research and policy have highlighted the importance of public trust for the success of vaccination programs. This paper will look at the problem of expert disagreement and trustworthiness in the case of vaccine research. Giubilini, Gur-Arie and Jamrozik (2025) have argued for a notion of trustworthiness involving virtues of experts, such as epistemic humility and transparency in order to deal with situations of uncertainty, when there is a minority of scientists disagreeing with the majority consensus. Using this account as a starting point, I will investigate the conditions necessary for the trustworthiness of institutions involved in vaccine research under uncertainty. I will highlight that, in addition to the virtues of individual researchers, certain structural features of the research community are required. More specifically, I will make the case for conditions that enable a fair resolution of disagreement: involving all relevant members of the scientific community and seeking solutions that adequately respond to the public’s needs and interests.
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