Ectogenesis and the Violinist
Article Sidebar
Main Article Content
Abstract
Michal Pruski and Richard C. Playford argue that if partial ectogenesis technology becomes available then it would undermine Judith Jarvis Thomson’s defense of abortion. Thomson argues that even if a fetus has a right to life, this is not a positive right to be given whatever one needs to survive; it is not a right to use the mother’s body or to risk her life without her permission. Pruski and Playford argue that when the risks involved in ectogenesis are comparable to those of abortion, then minimal decency requires gestational mothers to opt for ectogenesis over abortion. This argument hinges on egregious misunderstandings of (1) ectogenesis technology, (2) medical and surgical abortion, and (3) medical consent.
Article Details
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
By submitting his/her work to the Editorial Board, the author accepts, upon having his/her text recommended for publication, that Diametros applies the Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license to the works we publish. Under this license, authors agree to make articles legally available for reuse, without permission or fees. Anyone may read, download, copy, print, distribute or reuse these articles without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author, as long as the author and original source are properly cited. The author holds the copyright without any other restrictions. Full information about CC-BY: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.
How to Cite
References
Blackshaw B.P., Rodger D. (2019), “Ectogenesis and the Case against the Right to the Death of the Foetus,” Bioethics 33 (1): 76–81.
Blackshaw B.P. (2021), “Is Pregnancy Really a Good Samaritan Act?,” Christian Bioethics 27 (2): 158–168.
Boklage C.E. (1990), “Survival Probability of Human Conceptions From Fertilization to Term,” International Journal of Fertility 35 (2): 75–94.
Boonin D. (2002), A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Public Policy), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Cobb W.M. (1973), “The Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” Journal of the National Medical Association 65 (4): 345–348.
Kaczor Ch.R. (2010), The Ethics of Abortion: Women’s Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice, Routledge, New York.
Leridon H. (1977), Human Fertility: The Basic Components, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Marquis D. (2007), “The Moral-Principle Objection to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research,” Metaphilosophy 38 (2–3): 190–206.
Marquis D. (2013), “An Argument that Abortion is Wrong,” [in:] Ethical Theory: An Anthology, R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), 2nd ed., Blackwell, Oxford: 400–409.
Pruski M., Playford R.C. (2022), “Artificial Wombs, Thomson and Abortion – What Might Change?,” Diametros 19 (73): 35–53.
Räsänen J., Smajdor A. (2020), “The Ethics of Ectogenesis,” Bioethics 34 (4): 328–330.
Simkulet W. (2020), “Abortion and Ectogenesis: Moral Compromise,” Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (2): 93–98.
Smajdor A. (2007), “The Moral Imperative for Ectogenesis,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 16 (3): 336–345.
Thomson J.J. (1971), “A Defense of Abortion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1): 47–66.