Setting Health-Care Priorities. What Ethical Theories Tell Us. A Response to My Critics

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Published: Jun 30, 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1756
Keywords:
Utilitarianism Prioritarianism Sufficientarianism Contractualism Rawls Marginal Life-Extension Mental Health Maximin/Leximin

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Torbjörn Tännsjö
Department of Philosophy Stockholm University 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9670-4608

Abstract

The article provides answers to comments in this journal on my recent book, Setting Health-Care Priorities. What Ethical Theories Tell Us (Oxford University Press, 2019). Did I address all of the relevant theories? Yes, I did. Was my argument underdeveloped in any respects? Yes, at least in one as I should perhaps have discussed contractual ethical thinking more carefully. I do so in this response. Moreover, the critical comments raised have helped me to clarify my argument in many ways, for which I thank my critics.

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How to Cite
Tännsjö, Torbjörn. 2021. “Setting Health-Care Priorities. What Ethical Theories Tell Us. A Response to My Critics”. Diametros 18 (68):60-70. https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1756.
Issue
Vol. 18 No. 68 (2021)
Section
Discussions
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