Rawlsian Contractualism and Healthcare Allocation: A response to Torbjörn Tännsjö
Article Sidebar
Main Article Content
Abstract
The consideration of the problem of healthcare allocation as a special case of distributive justice is especially alluring when we only consider consequentialist theories. I articulate here an alternative Rawlsian non-consequentialist theory which prioritizes the fairness of healthcare allocation procedures rather than directly setting distributive parameters. The theory in question stems from Rawlsian commitments that, it is argued, have a better Rawlsian pedigree than those considered as such by Tännsjö. The alternative framework is worthy of consideration on its own merits, but it also casts light on two related difficulties with Tännsjö’s approach: (i) the limits of his supposedly ecumenical methodology, which is revealed to be dialectically suspect and (ii) issues with the type of abstraction and idealization from actual judgements and preferences which the approach requires.
Article Details
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
By submitting his/her work to the Editorial Board, the author accepts, upon having his/her text recommended for publication, that Diametros applies the Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license to the works we publish. Under this license, authors agree to make articles legally available for reuse, without permission or fees. Anyone may read, download, copy, print, distribute or reuse these articles without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author, as long as the author and original source are properly cited. The author holds the copyright without any other restrictions. Full information about CC-BY: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.
How to Cite
References
Cohen G.A. (1997), “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (1): 3-30.
Cohen G.A. (2003), “Facts and Principles,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (3): 211-245.
Cohen G.A. (2008), Rescuing Justice and Equality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA).
Daniels N. (2001), “Justice, Health, and Healthcare,” American Journal of Bioethics 1 (2): 2-16.
Goodin R. (2020), “Setting Health-Care Priorities: A Reply to Tännsjö,” Diametros, September: 1-9. https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1597
Miller D. (2013), “Political philosophy for Earthlings,” [in:] D. Miller, Justice for Earthlings: Essays in Political Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Rawls J. (1971), A Theory of Justice (1st edition), Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA).
Rescher N. (1969), “The Allocation of Exotic Medical Lifesaving Therapy,” Ethics 79 (3): 173-186.
Roebyns I. (2008), “Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice,” Social Theory and Practice 34 (3): 341-362.
Sen A. (2006), “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?,” Journal of Philosophy 103: 215–38.
Singer P. (2009), “Why We Must Ration Health Care,” New York Times Magazine. URL = https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/magazine/19healthcare-t.html [Accessed 27.12.21].
Stemplowska Z. (2008), “What’s Ideal about Ideal Theory?,” Social Theory and Practice 34 (3): 319-340.
Stemplowska Z., Swift A. (2012), “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy, D. Estlund (ed.), Oxford University Press: 373-389.
Tännsjö T. (2019), Setting Health-Care Priorities: What Ethical Theories Tell Us, Oxford University Press, Oxford.