Aristotle about the possibility to be unjust towards oneself
Article Sidebar
Main Article Content
Abstract
The aim of this article is to clarify the sense of Aristotle's aporia “whether it is possible to treat oneself unjustly or not” and to argue that it is possible to treat oneself unjustly voluntarily. Two passages in NE V 9 are particularly noteworthy, namely 1136a31-1136b1 and 1136b13-25. In the first passage Aristotle proposes the hypothesis that the uncontrolled person (acratic) is capable to treat oneself unjustly voluntarily. In the second passage he gives two arguments – “from apparent loss” and “from wish” – which aim to prove that no one can treat oneself unjustly voluntarily. Both arguments do not invalidate hypothesis, nor exclude the possibility to be unjust towards oneself voluntarily.
Downloads
Article Details
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
References
Ajschylos (1959), Prometeusz w okowach, [w:] Ajschylos, Tragedie, tłum. S. Srebrny, PWN, Warszawa: 166–216.
View in Google Scholar
Aristote (1959), L’ Éthique à Nicomaque, t. II : Commentaire, cz. 1 i 2, R.A. Gauthier, J.Y. Jolif (red., tłum.), Publications Universitaires, Louvain.
View in Google Scholar
Aristoteles (1960), Aristotelis Opera, A.I. Bekker, Ch.A. Brandis, O. Gigon (red., tłum.), Deutsche Akademie Wissenschaften, Berlin.
DOI
View in Google Scholar
Aristotle (1931), The Nicomachean Ethics , tłum. W.D. Ross, Oxford University Press, Humphrey Mildfold, London.
View in Google Scholar
Aristotle (1998), Nicomachean Ethics. Books VIII and IX, tłum. M. Pakaluk, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
DOI
View in Google Scholar
Aristotle (2002), Nicomachean Ethics, tłum. Ch. Rowe, Oxford University Press, New York.
DOI
View in Google Scholar
Aristotle (2004), Nicomachean Ethics, tłum. R. Crisp, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
View in Google Scholar
Aristotle (2011), The Eudemian Ethics, tłum. A. Kenny, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
DOI
View in Google Scholar
Arnold D.G. (2011), Coercion and Moral Responsibility, „American Philosophical Quarterly” 38 (1): 53–67.
View in Google Scholar
Arystoteles (1956), Etyka nikomachejska, tłum. D. Gromska, PWN, Warszawa.
View in Google Scholar
Bondeson W. (1974), Aristotle on Responsibility for One's Character and the Possibility of Character Change, „Phronesis” 19 (1): 59–65.
DOI
View in Google Scholar
Bostock D. (1988), Pleasure and Activity in Aristotle’s Ethics, „Phronesis” 33 (3): 251–272.
DOI
View in Google Scholar
Bostock D. (2000), Aristotle’s Ethics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
View in Google Scholar
Charles D. (2011), Akrasia: The Rest of the Story?, [w:] Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle, M. Pakaluk, G. Pearson (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 187–209.
View in Google Scholar
Dow J. (2011), Aristotle's Theory of the Emotions: Emotions as Pleasures and Pain, [w:] Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle, M. Pakaluk, G. Pearson (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 47–74.
View in Google Scholar
Festugière A.J. (1946), Aristote. Le plaisir. Introduction, traduction et notes, Vrin, Paris.
View in Google Scholar
Frede D. (2006), Pleasure and Pain in Aristotle's Ethics, [w:] The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, R. Kraut (red.), Blackwell Publishing Ltd., Malden, Oxford, Carlton, Victoria: 255–275.
View in Google Scholar
Galewicz W. (2003), Z Arystotelesem przez greckie tragedie, cz. 2: O błądzeniu, przymusie i dobrowolności, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków.
View in Google Scholar
Galewicz W. (2019), Odpowiedzialność i sprawiedliwość w etyce Arystotelesa, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty.
View in Google Scholar
Hardie W.F.R. (1968), Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
View in Google Scholar
Heinaman R. (2011), Pleasure as an Activity in the Nicomachean Ethics, [w:] Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle, M. Pakaluk, G. Pearson (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1–46.
View in Google Scholar
Hursthouse R. (1984), Acting and Feeling in Character: Nicomachean Ethics 3.i., „Phronesis” 29 (3): 252–266.
View in Google Scholar
Irwin T.H. (1980), Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle, [w:] Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, A.O. Rorty (red.), University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles: 117–155.
View in Google Scholar
Kenny A. (1978), The Aristotelian Ethics, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
DOI
View in Google Scholar
Moline J.N. (1989), Aristotle on Praise and Blame, „Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie” 71 (3): 283–302.
DOI
View in Google Scholar
Meyer S.S. (2006), Aristotle on the Voluntary, [w:] The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, R. Kraut (red.), Blackwell Publishing Ltd., Malden, Oxford, Carlton, Victoria: 137–157.
View in Google Scholar
Natali C. (2009), Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII. Symposium Aristotelicum, C. Natali (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford.
View in Google Scholar
Ortiz de Landázuri M.C. (2012), Aristotle on Self-Perception and Pleasure, „Journal of Ancient Philosophy” 6 (2): 1–17.
DOI
View in Google Scholar
Owen G.E.L. (1971/2), Aristotelian Pleasures, „Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society”, 72: 132–152.
DOI
View in Google Scholar
Pakaluk M. (2005), Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
View in Google Scholar
Pakaluk M. (2011), Mixed Actions and Double Effect, [w:] Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle, M. Pakaluk, G. Pearson (red.), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 211–231.
View in Google Scholar
Pangle L.S. (2004), Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
View in Google Scholar
Platon (2017), Prawa, tłum. D. Zygmuntowicz, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty.
View in Google Scholar
Politis V. (1993), The Primacy of Self-Love in the Nicomachean Ethics, „Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy” 11: 153–174.
View in Google Scholar
Price A.W. (1989), Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
DOI
View in Google Scholar
Price A.W. (2011), Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle, Oxford Clarendon Press, Oxford.
DOI
View in Google Scholar
Smolak M. (2013), Przyjaźń w świetle etyki Arystotelesa, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków.
View in Google Scholar
Skowroński L. (2014), Arystoteles o celu życia. Ku nowej interpretacji Etyki nikomachejskiej, Wydawnictwo Rolewski, Nowa Wieś.
View in Google Scholar