Metalinguistic Negotiations and Two Senses of Taste

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David Bordonaba-Plou
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0788-9733

Abstract

This paper defends the claim that the traditional Kantian division between two different types of judgments, judgments of personal preference (subjectively valid) and judgments of taste (intersubjectively valid), does not apply to some contexts in which metalinguistic negotiations take place. To begin, I first highlight some significant similarities between predicates of personal taste and aesthetic predicates. I sustain that aesthetic predicates are gradable and multidimensional, and that they often produce metalinguistic negotiations, characteristics that have motivated an individual treatment for predicates of personal taste. Secondly, contrary to Kant’s claim, I maintain that there are cases where judgments of personal preference are intersubjectively valid; in some contexts of metalinguistic negotiation, judgments of personal preference direct universality to a similar extent as judgments of taste. Some examples of real-life conversations will be presented to illustrate this point.

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How to Cite
Bordonaba-Plou, David. 2021. “Metalinguistic Negotiations and Two Senses of Taste”. Diametros 18 (67):1-20. https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1459.
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