Is Epistemic Safety Threatened by Frankfurt Cases? A Reply to Kelp

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Domingos Faria
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1726-7839

Abstract

I intend to argue that the counterexamples inspired by the Frankfurt-type cases against the necessity of an epistemic safety condition for knowledge are not plausible. The epistemic safety condition for knowledge is a modal condition recently supported by Sosa (2007) and Pritchard (2015), among others, and can be formulated as follows: (SC) If S knows that p on basis B, then S’s true belief that p could not have easily been false on basis B. I will try to argue that the safety condition, expressed in (SC), is still necessary for knowledge and that, therefore, epistemic safety is not threatened by Frankfurt-type cases. In particular, I want to show that Kelp’s counterexamples are ineffective against (SC).

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How to Cite
Faria, Domingos. 2020. “Is Epistemic Safety Threatened by Frankfurt Cases? A Reply to Kelp”. Diametros 17 (66), 66-71. https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1448.
Section
Polemics
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