Panpsychism in the Recent Debates about the Mind
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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to present contemporary varieties of panpsychism, i.e. a metaphysical view according to which at least some of the fundamental properties which constitute the world are mental. Despite its popularity in the history of philosophy, the view has been thought, in the analytic tradition, to be unscientific. Nevertheless, in light of some insolvable problems with the explanation of mind, panpsychism has become a view which is taken seriously as a correct metaphysical theory. In this article, I propose a broad definition of panpsychism in order to uncover the possible causes of its variety. Subsequently, I argue that there are two main motivations to embrace panpsychism: the law of continuity and the acceptance of fundamental monism. Further, I present some problems with panpsychism, especially the problem of combination. In the final part, I suggest that panpsychism should be taken seriously in the recent debates about the mind, regardless of its difficulties.
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