Death: The Loss of Life-Constitutive Integration

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Doyen Nguyen
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4405-4081

Abstract

This discussion note aims to address the two points which Lizza raises regarding my critique of his paper “Defining Death: Beyond Biology,” namely that I mistakenly attribute a Lockean view to his ‘higher brain death’ position and that, with respect to the ‘brain death’ controversy, both the notions of the organism as a whole and somatic integration are unclear and vague. First, it is known from the writings of constitutionalist scholars that the constitution view of human persons, a theory which Lizza also holds, has its roots in John Locke’s thought. Second, contrary to Lizza’s claims, the notions of the organism as a whole and somatic integration are both more than adequately described in the biomedical and biophilosophical literature.

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How to Cite
Nguyen, Doyen. 2018. “Death: The Loss of Life-Constitutive Integration”. Diametros 16 (60), 72-78. https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1244.
Section
Discussions
Author Biography

Doyen Nguyen, Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas (Angelicum)

Doyen Nguyen, M.D., S.T.D.
Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas (Angelicum) Theology
1 Largo Angelicum
00184 Rome, Italy

E-mail: btursiopsdn@gmail.com

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