Armstrong’s Theory of the Laws of Nature Confronted with the Problems of Identification and Inference (in Polish)

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Joanna Luc

Abstract

One of the modern approaches to the laws of nature regards them as relations between universals. The most advanced version of such an approach has been presented by D. M. Armstrong. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct and interpret Armstrong’s conception but also to evaluate his theory and to point out what expectations from it are inadequate. My point of reference are two objections to Armstrong’s ideas, namely the problems of identification and inference.I claim that Armstrong’s theory in general and his response to both problems in particular are based on some fundamental metaphysical principles, namely: the principle of identity for universals, the principle of non-contradiction, the relational principle of the indiscernibility of identicals and the principle of contingent necessity. The central part of my interpretation shows how from the laws of nature, properly understood, the occurrence of some states of affairs necessarily results provided that these principles are employed.

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Luc, Joanna. 2018. “Armstrong’s Theory of the Laws of Nature Confronted With the Problems of Identification and Inference (in Polish)”. Diametros 55 (55):132-57. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.1180.
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Author Biography

Joanna Luc, Jagiellonian University

Joanna LucJagiellonian UniversityDepartment of Philosophyul. Grodzka 52 Pl-31-044 KrakówE-mail: joanna.luc.poczta@gmail.com
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