Senses of objectivity. Henri Poincaré and Ernst Cassirer in the context of structural realism

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Damian Luty
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0194-9790

Abstract

The goal of the paper is to, at least partly, justify the rejection of what I term the thesis of the origins of structural realism. This thesis deals with the connections, postulated by a certain metaphilosophical narrative, between the contemporary positions of epistemic/ontic structural realism and the views held by physicists and philosophers from the early 20th century. In the paper I summarize the above-mentioned positions and the relationships they are supposed to have enjoyed with the philosophy of Henri Poincaré and Ernst Cassirer. I then proceed to illustrate why such relationships are ill-founded and present conclusions about the unique nature of both structural realism and the notions of objectivity and reality in their context.

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How to Cite
Luty, Damian. 2020. “Senses of Objectivity. Henri Poincaré and Ernst Cassirer in the Context of Structural Realism”. Diametros 18 (67), 54-70. https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1171.
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Author Biography

Damian Luty, Adam Mickiewicz University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy

Damian Luty

Adam Mickiewicz University

Department of Philosophy

60-568 Poznań, Polska

e-mail: damianluty@gmail.com

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