Phenomenology and the problem of the “in itself” of an object
Main Article Content
Abstract
The author presents his own interpretation of the phenomenological puzzle of the “in itself” of a real object and the world itself. The solution to this puzzle is of decisive importance for a proper understanding of transcendental phenomenology. According to Husserl, a transcendent object is “in itself” with reference to factual experience because its esse does not resolve itself into its percipi and it can exist even if it is not in fact experienced. However, the “in itself” of a real object does not mean its existence outside of all possible modes of givenness in consciousness, but is rather an ideal unity given in the infinite multiplicity of actual and possible appearances of the same determinable X. All real objects are units of sense, but sense does not penetrate the object in an infinite number of its manifestations. As a consequence, the inexhaustible X as a bearer of the identity of an object contains a surplus which goes beyond the sense. The main thesis of the paper is that the “in itself” of a transcendent object and the world corresponds with the pure X and its surplus exceeds the noematic senses.
Article Details
By submitting his/her work to the Editorial Board, the author accepts, upon having his/her text recommended for publication, that Diametros applies the Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license to the works we publish. Under this license, authors agree to make articles legally available for reuse, without permission or fees. Anyone may read, download, copy, print, distribute or reuse these articles without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author, as long as the author and original source are properly cited. The author holds the copyright without any other restrictions. Full information about CC-BY: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.
How to Cite
References
Bernet R. (1979), Perception as a Teleological Process of Cognition, „Analecta Husserliana” 9: 119–132.
Bernet R., Kern I., Marbach E. (1989), Edmund Husserl. Darstellung Seines Denkens, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg.
Brelage M. (1965), Studien zur Transzendentalphilosophie, Walter de Gruyter & Co, Berlin.
de Palma V. (2005), Ist Husserls Phänomenologie ein Transzendentaler Idealismus?, „Husserl Studies” 21: 183–206.
Derrida J. (1992), Przemoc i metafizyka. Esej o myśli Emmanuela Levinasa, tłum. K. Matuszewski,
P. Pieniążek, [w:] J. Derrida, Pismo filozofii, Inter Esse, Kraków: 161–223.
Drummond J. (1990), Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism. Noema and Object, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London.
Drummond J. (2014), Kontrowersje wokół noematu, tłum. W. Płotka, [w:] Wprowadzenie do fenomenologii.
Interpretacje, zastosowania, problemy, t. 1, W. Płotka (red.), Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa: 226–265.
Føllesdal D. (1969), Husserl’s Notion of Noema, „The Journal of Philosophy” 66: 680–687.
Husserl E. (1956), Erste Philosophie (1923/24), t. 1: Kritische Ideengeschichte, von R. Boehm (red.), [w:] Husserliana, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 7, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag.
Husserl E. (1973), Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907, von U. Claesges (red.), [w:] Husserliana, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 16, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag.
Husserl E. (1975), Idee czystej fenomenologii i fenomenologicznej filozofii. Księga pierwsza, tłum. D. Gierulanka, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa.
Husserl E. (1982), Medytacje kartezjańskie, tłum. A. Wajs, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa.
Husserl E. (1990), Idea fenomenologii. Pięć wykładów, tłum. J. Sidorek, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa.
Husserl E. (2000a), Badania logiczne, t. 2: Badania dotyczące fenomenologii i teorii poznania, cz. 1, tłum. J. Sidorek, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa.
Husserl E. (2000b), Badania logiczne, t. 2: Badania dotyczące fenomenologii i teorii poznania, cz. 2, tłum. J. Sidorek, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa.
Husserl E. (2002), Einleitung in die Philosophie. Vorlesungen 1922/23, von B. Goossens (red.), [w:] Husserliana, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 35, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London.
Husserl E. (2003), Transzendentaler Idealismus. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908–1921), von R.D. Rollinger, R. Sowa (red.), [w:] Husserliana, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 36, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London.
Husserl E. (2004), Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893–1912), von T. Vongehr, R. Giuliani (red.), [w:] Husserliana, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 38, Springer, Dordrecht.
Kern I. (1964), Husserl und Kant. Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag.
Łaciak P. (2012), Anonimowość jako granica poznania w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice.
Micali S. (2008), Überschüsse der Erfahrung. Grenzdimensionen des Ich nach Husserl, Springer, Dordrecht.
Smith D.W., McIntyre R. (1982), Husserl and Intentionality. A Study of Mind, Meaning and Language, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster.
Strasser S. (1959), Das Gottesproblem in der Spätphilosophie Edmund Husserls, „Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft” 67: 130–142.
Ströker E. (1987), Intentionalität und Konstitution. Wandlungen des Intentionalitätskonzepts in der Philosophie Husserls, [w:] E. Ströker, Phänomenologische Studien, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main: 54–74.
Zahavi D. (2012), Fenomenologia Husserla, tłum. M. Święch, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków.