Uncertainty and Control

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Published: Oct 4, 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.53.0.1100
Keywords:
uncertainty, control, agentive uncertainty, Newcomb’s paradox, death in Damascus

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Sven Ove Hansson
Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Philosophy and History

Abstract

In a decision making context, an agent’s uncertainty can be either epistemic, i.e. due to her lack of knowledge, or agentive, i.e. due to her not having made (full) use of her decision-making power. In cases when it is unclear whether or not a decision maker presently has control over her own future actions, it is difficult to determine whether her uncertainty is epistemic or agentive. Such situations are often difficult for the agent to deal with, but from an outsider’s perspective, they can have sensible pragmatic solutions.

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How to Cite
“Uncertainty and Control”. 2017. Diametros, no. 53 (October): 50-59. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.53.0.1100.
Issue
No. 53 (2017)
Section
Ethics and Uncertainty

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Author Biography

Sven Ove Hansson, Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Philosophy and History

Sven Ove Hansson, Professor
Royal Institute of Technology
Department of Philosophy and History
Brinellvägen 32
114 28 Stockholm
Sweden

E-mail: soh@kth.se

How to Cite

“Uncertainty and Control”. 2017. Diametros, no. 53 (October): 50-59. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.53.0.1100.
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