A Critique of Turri's Experimental Research on Selfless Assertions

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Grzegorz Gaszczyk

Abstract


In this paper, I show that Turri’s (2015a) experimental study concerning selfless assertions is defective and should therefore be rejected. One performs a selfless assertion when one states something that one does not believe, and hence does not know, despite possessing well supported evidence to the contrary. Following his experimental study, Turri argues that agents in fact both believe and know the content of their selfless assertions. In response to this claim, I demonstrate that the conclusions he draws are premature in this regard. More specifically, I criticize his methodology, showing that his study is not only incomplete but also yields contradictory results. In closing, I propose how such a study should be conducted in order to receive comprehensive results.


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How to Cite
Gaszczyk, Grzegorz. 2019. “A Critique of Turri’s Experimental Research on Selfless Assertions”. Diametros 16 (59), 23-34. https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1051.
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Articles
Author Biography

Grzegorz Gaszczyk, University of Groningen

Grzegorz Gaszczyk
University of Groningen
Faculty of Philosophy
Oude Boteringestraat 52
9712 GL Groningen, Netherlands
e-mail: gaszczyk.grzegorz@gmail.com

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