Empty names in the theory of direct reference. David Braun's conception and its weaknesses (in Polish)

Main Article Content

Zuzanna Gnatek

Abstract

David Braun (1993) develops two theories of empty names meant to be compatible with the Direct Reference Theory. I first present the main problems that empty names pose for it. Next, I discuss descriptivism (the main alternative to the Direct Reference Theory), elaborate how a descriptivist might try to deal with these problems, and explain why the descriptivist's approach is unsatisfactory. After explaining Braun's own position I argue that some aspects of his view are still quite problematic, especially his view on the relation between beliefs and propositions, his claim that there are some beliefs which do not express propositions, the fact that some important claims of the Direct Reference Theory have to be modifed to accommodate his account, the lack of semantic differentation between merely syntactically similar sentences, and the coarse-grainedness of the assignment of truth values and identity conditions to certain propositions.

Article Details

How to Cite
“Empty Names in the Theory of Direct Reference. David Braun’s Conception and Its Weaknesses (in Polish)”. 2011. Diametros, no. 27 (March): 130-49. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.27.2011.430.
Section
Other articles
Author Biography

Zuzanna Gnatek, Uniwersytet Gdański

Zuzanna Gnatek - studentka, Uniwersytet Gdański.

How to Cite

“Empty Names in the Theory of Direct Reference. David Braun’s Conception and Its Weaknesses (in Polish)”. 2011. Diametros, no. 27 (March): 130-49. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.27.2011.430.
Share |

References

Braun [1993] – D. Braun, Empty names, „Noûs” 27 (4) 1993: 449-469.

Braun [2005] – D. Braun, Empty names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names, „Noûs” 39 (4) 2005: 596-631.

Donnellan [1972] – K. Donnellan, Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions, [w:] Semantics of Natural Language, red. D. Davidson, G. Harman, D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1972.

Donnellan [1974] – K. Donnellan, Speaking of Nothing, „The Philosophical Review” (83) 1974: 3-31.

Frege [1892] – G. Frege, Sense and Reference, „The Philosophical Review” (57) 1948: 209-230.

Hughes [2004] – C. Hughes, Kripke. Names, Necessity and Identity, Oxford Univeristy Press, New York 2004.

Kaplan [1989] – D. Kaplan, Demonstratives, [w:] Themes from Kaplan, red. J. Almong, J. Perry, H. Wettstein, Oxford Univeristy Press, Oxford 1989: 481-614.

Kripke [1980] – S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1980.

Linsky [1977] – L. Linsky, Names and Descriptions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1977.

Salmon [1982] – N. Salmon, Reference and Essence, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1982.

Searle [1958] – J. Searle, Proper Names, „Mind” (67) 1958: 166-173.