Morality, Normativity, and the Good System 2 Fallacy
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In this commentary, I warn against a possible dual process misconception that might lead people to conclude that utilitarian judgments are normatively correct. I clarify how the misconception builds on (1) the association between System 2 and normativity in the dual process literature on logical/probabilistic reasoning, and (2) the classification of utilitarian judgments as resulting from System 2 processing in the dual process model of moral reasoning. I present theoretical and empirical evidence against both premises.
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Teksty zaproponowane do naszego czasopisma nie powinny być nigdzie publikowane przed ukazaniem się w „Diametros”. Wraz z przesłaniem swojego utworu redakcji autor akceptuje, że w momencie zakwalifikowania tekstu do publikacji czasopismo „Diametros” będzie stosowało licencję the Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). Na podstawie tej licencji autorzy zgadzają się, że ich prace mogą być zgodnie z prawem ponownie wykorzystywane do jakichkolwiek celów bez konieczności uzyskania uprzedniej zgody ze strony autora lub wydawcy. Każdy może prace te czytać, pobierać, kopiować, drukować, rozpowszechniać oraz przetwarzać, pod warunkiem poprawnego oznaczenia autorstwa oraz oryginalnego miejsca publikacji. Autorzy zachowują prawa autorskie do swoich utworów bez żadnych innych ograniczeń. Pełna informacja na temat licencji CC BY: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.
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