Scientific Realism and the Future Development of Science
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Nickles raises many original objections against scientific realism. One of them holds that scientific realism originates from the end of history illusion. I reply that this objection is self-defeating and commits the genetic fallacy. Another objection is that it is unknowable whether our descendants will regard our current mature theories as true or false. I reply that this objection entails skepticism about induction, leading to skepticism about the world, which is inconsistent with the appeal to the end of history illusion. Finally, I argue that we have an inductive rationale for thinking that will lead our descendants to regard our current mature theories as true.
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Teksty zaproponowane do naszego czasopisma nie powinny być nigdzie publikowane przed ukazaniem się w „Diametros”. Wraz z przesłaniem swojego utworu redakcji autor akceptuje, że w momencie zakwalifikowania tekstu do publikacji czasopismo „Diametros” będzie stosowało licencję the Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). Na podstawie tej licencji autorzy zgadzają się, że ich prace mogą być zgodnie z prawem ponownie wykorzystywane do jakichkolwiek celów bez konieczności uzyskania uprzedniej zgody ze strony autora lub wydawcy. Każdy może prace te czytać, pobierać, kopiować, drukować, rozpowszechniać oraz przetwarzać, pod warunkiem poprawnego oznaczenia autorstwa oraz oryginalnego miejsca publikacji. Autorzy zachowują prawa autorskie do swoich utworów bez żadnych innych ograniczeń. Pełna informacja na temat licencji CC BY: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.
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