Respect Towards Elderly Demented Patients
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Abstract
One question of applied ethics is the status and proper treatment of marginal cases, i.e., of people who are not yet or not anymore in full possession of their rational capacities, such as elderly demented people. Does one belittle them if one does not treat them like normal human adults, or would it be disrespectful and demanding too much if one did? Are elderly demented even the proper object of respect? In this paper I explore what Kant would say about these questions if he had addressed them. I look at what Kantian respect is, how he justifies the requirement to respect others, and what it demands more specifically. My claim is that Kant conceives of respect as a maxim of not exalting oneself above others. One should adopt this attitude independently of what the other is like. Differences between normal human adults and marginal cases are important for how one should treat them, but ultimately not for the question of why one should treat them with respect. Accordingly, elderly demented people should be respected, and it depends on the individual case what kind of actions this implies.
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