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Issue 27 (March 2011)
Objects of Representation
about author
Leslie Stevenson
Honorary Reader in Philosophy
University of St. Andrews, UK text (PDF)abstract
Leslie Stevenson, Objects of Representation, Diametros 27 (March 2011)
I distinguish four questions within Kant's "problem of reality": (1) What constitutes propositional content? (2) What constitutes truth? (3) What constitutes referential content? (4) What constitutes successful singular reference? I argue that Kant's transcendental idealism applies primarily to (3) - understood as: What makes some mental or linguistic items would-be referential representations - and secondly to (1). But with regard to (4) and (2), we do not create the objects and states of affairs in the world (there are human artifacts, of course, but most of them continue to exist quite independently of our representing activities). However
the contents of our representations in (3) and (1) do depend crucially on our conventions and rules, which are almost always socially learned.
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