In Defense of Brain Death: Replies to Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan

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John P. Lizza

Abstract

In this paper, I defend brain death as a criterion for determining death against objections raised by Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan. I argue that any definition of death for beings like us relies on some sortal concept by which we are individuated and identified and that the choice of that concept in a practical context is not determined by strictly biological considerations but involves metaphysical, moral, social, and cultural considerations. This view supports acceptance of a more pluralistic legal definition of death as well as acceptance of brain death as death.

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How to Cite
Lizza, John P. 2018. “In Defense of Brain Death: Replies to Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan”. Diametros 55 (55), 68-90. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.1177.
Section
Special Topic – Defining Death: Beyond Biology
Author Biography

John P. Lizza, Kutztown University of Pennsylvania

John P. Lizza, Ph.D.
Kutztown University of Pennsylvania
Department of Philosophy
15200 Kutztown Road
Kutztown, PA 19530
USA

E-mail: lizza@kutztown.edu

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