When do Risky Choices Justify Inequality?

Main Article Content

Keith Hyams

Abstract

Luck egalitarianism is the view that inequalities are justified when and only when a particular condition is met. Recent years have seen considerable debate about the exact nature of the risky choices thought by luck egalitarians to justify inequality. All positions in the debate emphasise the importance of choice, but they differ in the precise details of how choice features in the inequality-justifying condition. The present paper argues for a novel view about the conditions under which risky choices should justify choice in a manner that uncovers ambiguity and flaws in existing positions. It rejects existing accounts and develops a new hypothetical choice based account of inequality-justifying risk.

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How to Cite
Hyams, Keith. 2017. “When Do Risky Choices Justify Inequality?”. Diametros, no. 53 (October), 60-74. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.53.0.1101.
Section
Ethics and Uncertainty
Author Biography

Keith Hyams, University of Warwick, Department of Politics and International Studies

Keith Hyams, Associate Professor
University of Warwick
Department of Politics and International Studies
Social Sciences Building, The University of Warwick
Coventry, CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

E-mail: K.D.Hyams@warwick.ac.uk

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