Two Criticisms against Mathematical Realism

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Seungbae Park

Abstract

Mathematical realism asserts that mathematical objects exist in the abstract world, and that a mathematical sentence is true or false, depending on whether the abstract world is as the mathematical sentence says it is. I raise two objections against mathematical realism. First, the abstract world is queer in that it allows for contradictory states of affairs. Second, mathematical realism does not have a theoretical resource to explain why a sentence about a tricle is true or false. A tricle is an object that changes its shape from a triangle to a circle, and then back to a triangle with every second.

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How to Cite
Park, Seungbae. 2017. “Two Criticisms Against Mathematical Realism”. Diametros, no. 52 (June), 96-106. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.52.2017.1061.
Section
Articles
Author Biography

Seungbae Park, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology

Seungbae Park, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Division of General Studies
Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology
Ulju-gun, Ulsan 44919
Republic of Korea

Email: nature@unist.ac.kr

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